Essay | Paraphrased Away: The Problem with Thin Ontology

Revealing VanInwagen's self-defeating argumentation in promotion of thick ontology. Written by Samantha Robyn Norrah for PHI 420: Metametaphysics with Professor McElhoes at Arizona State University, July 2022.

Paraphrased Away: The Problem with Thin Ontology

Samantha Robyn Norrah

1. Introduction

Ontology is the study of the nature of being, but we can understand 'being' itself as within, outside, and without our conception of 'existence.' Metaphysicians divide these views into thick and thin ontology, where the terms are studied as distinct and meaningful or merged and meaningless (McElhoes 2017, p. 5). Peter Van Inwagen argues against thick ontology using his theory of being and a hypothetical Martian counterexample. In this paper, I carefully consider Van Inwagen's view against thick ontology and argue that it is unconvincing because it is self-defeating to the objective of thin ontology and exemplifies thick ontologies validity. To demonstrate my thesis, I will first provide background on this ontological divide and present Van Inwagen’s argument against thick ontology. Then I will state my rebuttal and reasons to believe that thick ontology is correct. Finally, I will address possible objections to my central argument and offer a conclusion.

1. Exposition

The difference between thin and thick ontology stems from a divergence in query. Willard Quine, a contemporary analytic philosopher, thought that our primary ontological concern should focus on the realist question of “what is there?” Alternatively, philosophers such as Sartre and Heidegger thought that in order for us to contrive “what is there,” we must first answer “what is being?” Ontic study is significant for its inclusion of our immediate reality, but it is believed that there are metaphysical foundations that must also be explored and established before building onto additional lines of inquiry. When ontologies acknowledge such complexities and draw distinction in ‘being’ and ‘existence,' they are considered thick ontologies. Conversely, thin ontologies either merge these terms meaning or argue that questions surrounding them are empty or incoherent. (McElhoes 2017, p. 4-5).

Peter Van Inwagen is a thin ontologist that argues against thick ontology through a counterexample taking place in a possible world where Martians can commune with humans. In the hypothetical Martian language, there are no direct translations for the terms of ‘being’ and ‘exist.’ The conceptual notions, however, can be paraphrased. For example, ‘x does not exist’ can be relayed as ‘everything is not x.’ The sentences may hint to variable interpretations where one’s sense of being differs in meaning from the other. Van Inwagen explains that this is a result of mistakenly ascribing being onto natures (Van Inwagen 2009, p. 477). It may be in the nature of one to compose their sense of existences in a way that is distinct from another, but this does not negate that both entities participate in the same ‘being.' To Van Inwagen, “being is the most barren and abstract of all categories,” it holds at an ultimate and unlimited level, encompassing everything univocally (Van Inwagen 2009, p. 478). He argues that if everything in this counterexample can be paraphrased, then that must mean that the terms of ‘being’ and ‘exist’ do not add expression to our language. If this is the case, then thin ontology is correct in asserting that these terms are indistinguishable. Therefor, thick ontology is not correct. (McElhoes 2017, p. 12).

1. Argument

Designating the concepts of ‘being’ and ‘nature’ has allowed Van Inwagen to saturate essentially any case of paraphrasing with an underlying notion of irrevocable being. Arguably, with his methodology, general utterances could, at a most basic level, paraphrase another entirely contrast to the other. Since ‘being,’ without expression at its most primitive level, is universal. As a stretch, not much further from the hypothetical Martian communications, a cow’s ‘moo’ could paraphrase a daisy’s ‘––.’ The observable differences come down to Van Inwagen’s explanation for ‘natures.’ When regarding being in this format, it seems that everything we know or assume, both inside and outside of ourselves, is somewhat illusive. As ‘natures’ pull from the abstractions in Van Inwagen’s sense of being to curate a facade of separateness second to it. 

One quote Van Inwagen uses in his counterexample is from René Descartes, “I think, therefor I am.” Descartes published this statement in Meditations on First Philosophy while reflecting on doubts clouding his existence. He decided that reality could not be a grand illusion as “God is no deceiver” (Descartes 1911, p. 28). If Van Inwagen’s thin ontology is true, Descartes suspicions must be as well; in that we are living an illusion of individualized nature or separateness beyond our being. For Van Inwagen’s counterexample asserts that these distinctions are expressionless and irrelevant of being. In example, his paraphrasing of Descartes words into the Martian language is “I think, therefore not everything is not I” (Van Inwagen 2009, p. 478). In Descartes instance, being is introspected and individualized where in the Martian paraphrasing, being is cast against all that there is, is not, or could be outside of an identity. ‘Being,’ as Van Inwagen characterizes, is linked intrinsically between the examples through an ulterior presentation, disconnected from the meanings that the sentences may otherwise derive. So, no sentences technically need to be paraphrased or even uttered to show that his sense of being is largely sufficient without proof outside of it simply ‘being.’

It follows from Van Inwagen’s Martian counterexample that there is an evident divide between an individual and what is considered to be separate from them. Where some ontologists observe this as the ‘being’ and ‘exist’ distinction, Van Inwagen argues through this intent by running assumptions between them. But if we reduce being to even a silent abstraction, we are limiting our potential to grasp what is, or could be, outside of us and that concept of being. If thin ontology is anchored on realist investigation, then Van Inwagen’s counterexample proves to be self defeating against the cause by restricting this discovery. The human in his scenario is no closer to understanding the Martian in that the meaning is revoked from the comparisons of thinking. No perspective can be gained. Thus, we should acknowledge the validity in thick ontology, exploring the importance of dualistic or multifaceted concepts of ‘being’ and ‘exist’ that present in our language and may be realized in others. There are innumerable perspectives within life as we know it; beyond human or Martian, cow or daisy, there are universes and atoms that exist past our everyday perception. Life could be layered in such a way that makes sense of categorizing by animation or consciousness, as Sartre and Heidegger propose. The practice of examining other possible worlds, near and far from here or our imagination, allows us to comparatively work and grasp what it could be like to be anything other than what we presume we are. That is the core of our ontological inquiry, the epitome of our very nature: to be individuals, amongst a sea of mostly unknowable things, venturing to know of how and why we and others exist as separately as we do.

1. Objection

Someone might object to my assumption that Van Inwagen’s theory of being and counterexample are self-defeating against thin ontology. Thin ontologists consider realist inquiry, but it is not necessary that they focus on uncovering perspectival aspects of “what there is.” They ask “what should we be realists about?” Questioning what exists externally, of the physical world, and of reality. But this does not imply a need to understand the depths, perspectives, or consciousness of some other thing. Therefor, Van Inwagen’s view is not self-defeating to the objective of thin ontology. 

If Van Inwagen’s view holds as a convincing thin ontology, I would still argue that it is self-defeating. Anything that rises from the nature of an individual or group is essentially meaningless and illusive to Van Inwagen’s sense of being. If this is true, Van Inwagen’s view is itself an empty prediction based on only his experience as his nature. In fact, even his very nature would be absorbed and rendered meaningless under his concept. The entire point of his ‘being' singularly removes and distances from his theories to where it could exist entirely of its own terms and discretions, mismatching Van Inwagen’s criteria and deflating his view.

1. Conclusion

In this paper, I argued that Van Inwagen’s theory of being lead to a universal nature of illusion. The consequences of this presented as self-defeating to thin ontology and revealed to be similarly of issue for Van Inwagen, himself. Counterintuitive claims within his hypothetical Martian counterexample lead to thick ontology, indicating its legitimacy as a metaphysical study over thin ontology. Notions of individuality and separateness derived within paraphrasing revealed a potential to express past our perception or ‘nature.’ It is in this potential that discovery is freed. Allowing for distinctions, of both in linguistic expression and life force, in the terms ‘being' and ‘exist.’ Therefor, Van Inwagen's view against thick ontology is unconvincing because it is self-defeating and exemplifies thick ontologies validity.

Work Cited

Descartes, R. (1911). Meditations On First Philosophy. In E. S. Haldane (Trans.), The Philosophical Works of Descartes(pp. 1–32). essay, Cambridge University Press. 

McElhoes, D. (n.d.). Lecture 9: Quinean Ontology - Just Serious Enough. PHI 420: Metametaphysics. Retrieved July 31, 2022, from http://www.public.asu.edu/~dmcelhoe/PHI420MM/MetaMetaphysicsLecture9/MetaMetaphysicsLecture9.mp4. 

Vallicella, B. (n.d.). Thin (Analytic) and Thick (Continental) Conceptions of Being and the Question of Modes of Being. The Maverick Philosopher. Retrieved July 31, 2022, from https://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2011/02/thin-analytic-and-thick-continental-conceptions-of-being.html 

Van Inwagen, P. (2009). Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment. In D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (pp. 472–506). Essay, Clarendon Press.